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The Shame of Being Human 








“The artist or the philosopher is quite incapable of creating a people… But books of philosophy and 
works of art contain their sum of unimaginable sufferings that forewarn of the advent of a people. 
They have resistance in common – their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to 





In his powerful and sensitive reading of the testimonies of Primo Levi, Gilles Deleuze 
forces us to confront what he terms the “shame of being man”. Such shame Deleuze 
explained derived from the understanding that man was capable of all too human 
atrocities. For Deleuze, however, this was not simply about forcing us confront the 
ways in which historic fascism forced many to shamefully compromise with power. 
Wilhelm Reich has already set out those details with some purpose1. It also 
demanded a more complex and sophisticated grasp of the question of human 
survival – or more important still, what happens when the political strategies of 
populations are reduced to barest of bio-political conditions such that life itself 
appears at the base levels of its very existence. As Deleuze explained:  
 
It does not mean we are all assassins, that we are all 
guilty… of Nazism. Levi says it admirably: It doesn’t 
mean the executioners and the victims are all the 
same… There are a lot of people who maintain, ‘Oh yes, 
we are all guilty’… No, nothing of the sort. We cannot 
confuse the executioners with the victim. So the ‘shame 
of being a man’ does not mean we are all the 
same…The ‘shame of being a man’ means at once ‘how 
could men do that’ – some men, that is, other than me 
– how could they do that? And second, how have I 
myself nonetheless taken sides? I didn’t become an 
executioner, but I still took sides to have survived, and 
there is a certain shame in having survived.   
 
Such questions of survival, as Deleuze maintained, were less about the old Sovereign 
right to protect, than they were about the ‘survival of a population that believes 
itself to be better than its enemy, which it now treats not as the juridical enemy of 
 
1 See Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascicm (Farrar, Straus & Giroux, New York: 1970)  
the old sovereign but as a toxic or infectious agent, a sort of ‘biological danger’.2 But 
what has become of this vexed question of survival in the 21st Century? Are we still 
compelled to write, as Deleuze insisted, because we are continuously witness to a 
shamed existence? What form does shame take as our politics is increasingly 
reduced to the sheer question of survival in the face of worldly extinction? And was 
Deleuze correct to insist that resistance to shame is found in the arts and the idea of 
a more poetic subjectivity that liberates the otherwise imprisoned life? 
 
This paper will begin to address these questions by offering a political and 
philosophical survey of the contemporary security terrain via the corpse littered 
landscapes of the 20th Century. It will do so by arguing for a more rigorous 
engagement with the literary field, as a way to critique the violence of the present, 
along with the possibilities of liberating the subject from the specter of its own 
demise. Thinking against violence in the present demands harnessing the political 
and philosophical power of the literary imagination, which demands liberating the 
poetic in thought and action. What is understood to be the poetic figure here, as 
Deleuze intimated, refers to an aesthetic conceptualization of “styles” notably found 
in the arts – especially literature. The poetic figure both embodies the violence of 
the times, while through its imaginative and speculative angles of vision, allows for 
alternative mediations which break free from the spectral destinies of positivist 
enslavements.   
 
The Politics of Shame 
The question of shame, as testified by Levi, amongst others, brings us directly to 
complex interplay between acts of violence and its forced witnessing to the 
disruption of absolute moral demarcations3. Such violence, as Giorgio Agamben has 
noted4, becomes all the more problematic as it takes place by perpetrators without a 
crime seen to be committed. Shame as such if often applied as a post-humus 
inscription. The very destruction of the human, even while they are still alive, doesn't 
however simply happen in “exceptional” or extreme conditions. On the contrary, 
violence often appears arbitrary, banal, and normalized in its routine enactments of 
torturous suffering. Attentions as such have been rightly drawn to the investments 
populations make in the perpetuation of oppressive logics, which defy neat 
explanations tied to ideological emblems. This is what Griselda Pollock and Max 
Silverman have identified to be the recurrence of a “concentrationary imaginary”5, 
demanding continuous vigilance to everyday forces of fascism and human 
subjugation, including the hidden order of politics and violence, and the ongoing 
reproduction of fascistic aesthetics, which frame the witnessing of violence.   
 
Shame itself however is not a value neutral category. It is often pre-figured in the 
collective consciousness. Inextricably bound to the politics of authenticating “the 
victim”, the question of shame is continuously mediated through hierarchies of 
tragedy through which some lives are presented as more valuable in death than 
others. How many Western scholars, for instance, begin and end with the Holocaust 
 
2 Gilles Deleuze, Foucault (Continuum: 2006) p. 76. 
3 See Primo Levi, If This is a Man (Abacus: 1991) 
4 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Soverign Power & Bare Life (Stanford, Stanford University Press: 1998) 
5 See Griselda Pollock & Max Silverman [eds.], Concentrationary Imaginaries (I.B. Taurus: 2015) 
without attending to the wider genocides in history – not least indigenous and racial 
persecution wrought by modern political projects? It is mistaken to also see shame 
as an object that might be studied in a psychological frame. Of course, the feeling of 
shame, like remorse and genuine regret may be evident in the reflective sensibilities 
of perpetrators of violence and widespread slaughter. The shame of being man, 
however, points to a more generalizable field in which the forces of history rightly or 
wrongly assume certain political qualities by drawing our more intimate attentions 
to particular memories of suffering and human devastation.  
 
Nor is shame quite so self-evident, as a superficial reading of Deleuze might suggest. 
This point has been rightly made by Zygmunt Bauman, who has noted, ‘The 
unspoken terror permeating our collective memory of the Holocaust (and more than 
contingently related to the overwhelming desire not to look the memory in its face) 
is the gnawing suspicion that the Holocaust could be more than an aberration, more 
than a deviation from an otherwise straight path of progress, more than a cancerous 
growth on the otherwise healthy body of the civilized society; that, in short, the 
Holocaust was not an antithesis of modern civilization and everything (or so we like 
to think) it stands for’6. As an historic event born of modernity, Bauman writes, it 
was ‘fully in keeping with everything we know about civilization, its guiding spirit, its 
priorities, its immanent vision of the world – and of the proper way to pursue human 
happiness together with a perfect society’.  
 
The shame of being human thus conceived works in many ambiguous and at times 
conflicting ways7. On one level, this has to do with the experience of a catastrophe 
that now lies as a condition of political philosophy and even constitutes its “internal 
presupposition”: the shame of being a survivor, which becomes equal to the shame 
of remaining human in the face of this growing catastrophe on a daily basis.  the 
other hand, this failure also concerns the repeated attempts on the part of those 
who seek to conceal themselves from this shame by invoking the moral concepts like 
desperate alibis, or to assign the different degrees of guilt and distribute justice 
between victims, executioners, and accomplices. And yet, merely the act of living has 
become a political decision for everyone today, who has to some unconscious 
degree become an accomplice to this daily catastrophe, no matter how distant in 
space and time, or how much a particular group might claim to suffer “equally,” 
though not in the same way, since as we have seen, the birth of every particular 
right also brings with it a new classes of strangers and those who do not have an 
allotted share. 
 
From the perspective of power, on a second level, the apportioning of shame can 
often be divorced from its operations, along with the overt politicization of tragedies 
and violent encounters, which often works by displacing attentions. Indeed, the 
capacity for historical shame to be appropriated and used in the furtherance of 
violence is all too evident to students of even the most recent history of warfare. 
Rwandans failure, for example, being one of the most vocal pretexts to summon 
 
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Polity Press: 1991) 
7 On the political problematic of shame in the thought of Deleuze, see Ian Buchanan, Deleuzism: A Meta-commentray (Durham, Duke University 
Press: 2000) pp. 73-93  
forth the invasion forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Genocidal shame would in these 
instances underwrite the slaughter of tens of thousands all in the name of 
humanitarianism and the desire to save strangers – especially from themselves. 
Shame, however, as Deleuze writes, has the potential for a double reading, forcing 
us to confront the hidden order of violence. Hence, more than resurrecting the 
forgotten casualties of history, the queston of shame offers alterative ways to 
“figure out” dogmatic images of thought into which life has been violently 
castigated.  
 
The burden of shame is frequently deployed in the guise of a resurrected “moral 
symbol”. It is a figurative specter, which is either placed onto the shoulders of others 
who have benefitted least from the plunder of the enlightenment – or more 
recently, tied to the moral justification for violence to sanction liberal 
interventionism. In light of this, asking, “what is shame” is futile, as it merely points 
to prefigured ideological claims i.e. the event of its occurrence is already 
determined. What matters more is the ways in which the concept of shame 
functions politically, setting out in the process the moral parameters (including the 
justification for violence), which emanating from the tragic figures of history, author 
the conditions of the new. Whose shame are we actually referring to? What is being 
authored and what is being denied through its very utterance? How is the politics of 
survival bound up and further released through its burdensome discourse?  And how 
is the very idea of the “victim” set adrift upon its blood-soaked shores?  
 
In a particularly insightful contribution on the horrors of the 20th Century, Simona 
Forti has set out the problem of violence’s relationship to the victim (importantly in 
that order of sequence)8. This is what she terms The Dostoyevsky Paradigm. Drawing 
figurative attention to Nicholas Stavrogin from Dostoyevsky's powerful and 
prophetic masterpiece Demons, Forti points to a predominance of a historically 
grounded and deeply structured understanding of mass violence, in which absolute 
power is wagered against the absolute victim. Focusing on the ghost of Stavrogin 
who, like a fallen angel, is said to be the most magnificent and the greatest of the 
damned in all of Dostoyevsky's work, Forti recognizes how his body is inscribed with 
the veritable markings of the violence of a Century, in particular its ontologically 
determined signature of evil which is largely explained in terms of the “abyss of 
freedom” or what Bauman would identify as being modernity’s “abhorration”. 
 
Definitive here is an account of political events, which often analyze their occurrence 
by invoking foundational typologies, neatly marking out wicked demons and absolute 
victims. Forti explains this by recounting Stavrogin's confession to Bishop Tikhon in a 
crucial chapter on the desecration of the young girl Matryosha: 
 
The freedom that makes him capable of destruction 
goes past the point of no return. It does so, without any 
possibility of redemption, when the wickedness he is 
capable of has its object the absolute innocence of the 
victim. It is one of the greatest literary moments in the 
 
8 Simona Forti, New Demons: Rethinking Power and Evil Today (Stanford, Stanford University Press: 2014) 
book, but also one of its most philosophically eloquent. 
This relationship of oppression -- with an all powerful 
perpetrator on one side, faced by the total 
powerlessness of the victim on the other -- expresses 
what I believe is Dostoyevsky's concept of evil in its 
absolute pure form . . . And if in this case of the radical 
action of evil is portrayed in the microcosm of a 
personal relationship between two people, a little later 
it will be ready to be projected on a large scale and 
refined, providing his twentieth century heirs with the 
hermeneutic key to absolute political evil9.  
 
As Forti rightly argues, while Dostoyevsky nuances his grandiose dialectical tensions 
in the widely cited fable of the Grand Inquisitor from the Brothers Karamazov), his 
literary works are still found wanting when applied to the behaviors of the masses. 
In ways that are reminiscent of the warnings provided by Reich on The Mass 
Psychology of Fascism, the Grand Inquisitor fable is rightly shown to be limited 
insofar as rests upon an understanding of the organization of violence that draws 
upon the docility of populations. It thus falls short when accounting for techniques 
of domination, through which power can manipulate the desire for violence in life 
affirming ways, whether this is encouraging the masses to embrace policies of racial 
and social engineering that often revel prejudices already existent within the 
political system, or more troubling still, positively investing in the willful subjugation 
of others. Overcoming this demands a return to the work of Levi:  
 
Thus, by ideally opposing Levi to Dostoyevsky and what 
the Russian writer represents, we can conclude that the 
Muselmann -- what resulted from the degradation of 
the camp -- was not solely and not predominantly the 
product of the abyssal freedom of a subject who had 
taken the place of God; nor was he the object on which 
the perverse jouissance of the death impulse had been 
discharged. He became what he became through a 
dense but ordinary weave of intentions, actions, and 
objectives whose weft proved fatal10.  
 
 
The Scream of Humanity 
The shame of being human, imagined by Deleuze and engaged with here, 
encourages engagement with both literature and the visual arts as a different order 
of resistance and enagagement. Writing on the work of T. H. Lawrence, Deleuze 
argues that ‘The finest writers have singular conditions of perception that allow 
them to draw on or shape aesthetic percepts like veritable visions’11. Lawrence, in 
particular, he argues, expresses ‘a profound desire, a tendency to project – things, 
 
9 Forti, New Demons p. 40 
10 Forti, New Demons p. 308 
11 Deleuze, Critical & Clinical p. 116 
into reality, into the future and even into the sky – an image of himself and others so 
intense that it has a life of its own’12. Deleuze reserved the same “revolutionary” 
qualities – what he terms the ‘fabulatory function’ for the visual arts and their 
capacity to free themselves from representational schematics. As he writes, ‘no art is 
figurative. Paul Klee’s famous formula – “Not to render the visible, but to render 
visible” means nothing else. The task of painting is defined as the attempt to render 
visible forces that are not themselves visible’.  
 
For Deleuze, the artist who was most successful at rendering the invisible forces 
visible was Francis Bacon, who’s isolated figures ‘break with representation, to 
disrupt narration, to escape illustration, to liberate the figure’13. As he writes, 
‘Bacon’s Figures seem to be one of the most marvelous responses in the history of 
painting to the question, How can one make invisible forces visible? This is the 
primary function of the Figures’14. Indeed, for Deleuze, the importance of Bacon is 
that he breaks away from “figuration” and its penchant for imposing a determinable 
narrative into the scene, by elevating the figure to such importance that the hidden 
forces of violence appear more defining – ‘a deformed and deforming movement 
that at every moment transfers the real image onto the body in order to constitute 
the Figure’15. Such a constitution of the body, for Deleuze, points to a different order 
of violence where movement is defining, ‘as if invisible forces were striking the head 
from many different angles’16. Or as Bacon would write, ‘We nearly always live 
through screens – a screened existence. And I sometimes think, when people say my 
work looks violent, that perhaps I have from time to time been able to clear away 
one or two of the veils or screens’17.    
 
Deleuze’s intervention has encouraged a rethinking of aesthetics to foreground what 
Jacques Ranciere has termed the “Figures of History”18, whose challenging figural 
specters to our images of thought should provoke much more purposeful and 
incisive critique. And yet has Richard J. Bernstein explains, there when confronting 
the realities of violence, there our political and philosophical responses are found 
wanting: ‘Even a momentous event like 9/11 does not provoke much thinking about 
violence. Our age may well be called “The Age of Violence” because representations 
of real or imagined violence (sometimes blurred and fused together) are 
inescapable. But this surfeit of images and talk of violence dulls and even inhibits 
thinking’. Understanding the shame of being human thus requires a more attentive 
appreciation of the historical present of violence and its continuums.  
 
Rancière’s Figures of History embodies the tragedies of modernity. Our first glimpse 
of this appears with Larry Rivers’s Erasing the Past II that adorns the cover of his 
aptly titled book. Rivers’s subtle erasure of the image of a Holocaust survivor 
(invoking all-too-evident connections with the cover art of the Abacus edition of 
Primo Levi’s If This Is a Man and The Truce) captures the author’s contention that we 
 
12 Deleuze, Critical & Clinical pp. 117-118 
13 Deleuze, Bacon, p. 6 
14 Deleuze, Bacon p. 41 
15 Deleuze, Bacon, p. 14 
16 Deleuze, Bacon p. 42 
17 David Silvester, Interviews With Francis Bacon p. 82 
18 Jacques Ranciere, Figures of History (Polity Press: 2014) 
must approach all representations of historical events with skepticism — questioning 
what is memorialized, what is erased, what is being shown, what is being slowly 
forgotten; history, he claims, should be rethought by attending to the hidden traces. 
This leads him to argue, “history isn’t done yet with turning itself into stories.” This 
personally draws him to range of compelling examples from Goya, Otto Dix, to 
Claude Lanzmann and Zoran Music in order to highlight particular attention to the 
victims of historical force to rework the aesthetic field of worldly perception and its 
distributions of the sensible. This demands a rethinking of the power of aesthetics. 
As he writes, conclusions are ‘sometimes too easily drawn that the extermination is 
“unrepresentable” or “unshowable” — notions in which various heterogeneous 
arguments conveniently merge: the joint incapacity of real documents and fictional 
imitations to reflect the horror experienced; the ethical indecency of representing 
that horror; the modern dignity of art which is beyond representation and the 
indignity of art as an endeavor after Auschwitz’. 
 
Bacon work’s returns here with considerable expressive force. The artist draws us to 
two particular works, which include his Painting 1946 and Study for a Portrait 1949. 
The former masterpiece is arguably Bacon’s crowning achievement in terms of 
revealing the violence of the body in ways that unsettle illustrative determinism. The 
timing of the piece certainly invokes connections to fascism and its theological 
orientations. And yet the ambiguities of the main Figure offer many challenging 
readings, such that divisions between human/animal, screaming/laughter, and 
witness/spectacle, executioner/victim are difficult to establish. The painting also 
continues Bacon’s fascination with “the scream”, which as Deleuze suggests points 
to a ‘coupling of forces, the perceptible force of the scream and the imperceptible 
force that makes one scream’19. The screaming figures as such points to futurity as it 
‘captures or detects an invisible force’, the diabolical future, which ‘contains them 
potentially’. But what of Painting 1949, which pre-figures with remarkable similarity 
the figure of Adolf Eichmann? What diabolical future might be forcing this most 
banal of Figures to scream at its coming?     
 
The Trials of Humanity 
The witnessing of violence and its vexed questions of shame and complicity are 
doubly complicated by the issue of justice. Nowhere was this more apparent than 
with Hannah Arendt’s widely documented and theorized critique of the Eichmann 
trials, what this meant in terms of the legal intent for this crime, and how this 
related to the conscious act of thinking about the actions committed on behalf of the 
perpetrators. The term banal was used as a counterpoint here to decry both the 
perceived thoughtful actions of Eichmann, among others, along with emphasizing 
the wider political significance in terms of what was actually being put on trial. As 
Judith Butler has explained,  
 
By writing about Eichmann, Arendt was trying to 
understand what was unprecedented in the Nazi 
genocide – not in order to establish the exceptional 
case for Israel, but in order to understand a crime 
 
19 Deleuze, Bacon p. 43 
against humanity, one that would acknowledge the 
destruction of Jews, Gypsies, gay people, communists, 
the disabled and the ill. Just as the failure to think was a 
failure to take into account the necessity and value that 
makes thinking possible, so the destruction and 
displacement of whole populations was an attack not 
only on those specific groups, but on humanity itself. As 
a result, Arendt objected to a specific nation-state 
conducting a trial of Eichmann exclusively in the name 
of its own population20.  
 
What Arendt perhaps couldn't quite fully grasp at the time, was that she would 
figure in the drama of justice and its spectacle, which she vocally condemned. She 
wasn't a distanced observer or some “outside” critic, on the contrary, she became 
part of the lived memory of its performance and key to the way we understand the 
political fabrics, tensions and deliberations continuously remade through the 
forensic details of the criminal proceedings.  Nobody has understood this process 
better than Michael Shapiro whose trans-disciplinary methods are pioneering in the 
field of International Affairs and Security Studies. Writing on the performative nature 
of justice in a powerful reworking of the Foucauldian idea of the dispositif, Shapiro 
argues that ‘the primary discursive condition of possibility for the Nuremburg war 
crimes trials was a new collective subject, “humanity”’21. And in order raise the 
possibility that such a crime as a crime against humanity existed, there was a need to 
develop juridical discourse armed with a new anthropological object – namely the 
human as a collective entity, which could be consciously endangered.  
 
Shapiro returns to the scene of humanity’s trial by putting forward what he terms 
“literary justice”, which is said to offer a more aesthetically astute approach to 
critical thinking by deliberately disrupting the epistemological ground upon which 
the pursuit of justice is often articulated. Bypassing the legalistic account of rights so 
often tied to juridical frameworks, Shapiro draws attention to a particular moment 
from Mathias Enard’s remarkable novel Zone, where the key protagonist, Francis 
Servain Mirkovic, sees his former commander Blaskic on trial in The Hague. This is 
worth citing as it speaks directly to the performative enactment of justice and its 
complex lines of subjectification so often missed by legal descriptions: 
 
in his box at The Hague among the lawyers the 
interpreters the prosecutors the witnesses the 
journalists the onlookers the soldiers of the UNPROFOR 
who analyzed the maps for the judges commented on 
the possible provenance of bombs according to the size 
of the crater which gave rise to so many counter-
arguments all of it translated into three languages… 
everything had to be explained from the beginning, 
historians testified to the past of Bosnia, Croatia, and 
 
20 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/aug/29/hannah-arendt-adolf-eichmann-banality-of-evil 
21 Michael Shapiro, War Crimes (Polity Press: 2015) p. 15 
Serbia since the Neolithic era by showing how 
Yugoslavia was formed, the geographers commented 
on demographic statistics, censuses, land surveys, 
political scientists explained the differential political 
forces present in the 1990’s22  
 
Here the anti-figure of humanity, Blaskic, appears inserted into a conceptual 
landscape, which in the process of offering tremendously powerful, intricate and 
multifaceted form of political fabulation, re-enforces the idea of justice as a network 
of relations wholly dependent upon regimes of visibility and processes of 
subjectivation. It also sets out the complex interplay between the figures that 
populate the text, allowing for the issue of violence to be temporally framed: As 
Mirkovic further laments: 
 
I thought about what I would have said if they 
questioned me, how would I have explained the 
inexplicable, probably I too would have had to go back 
to the dawn to time, to the frightened prehistoric man 
painting in his cave to reassure himself, to Paris making 
off with Helen, to the death of Hector, the sack of Troy, 
to Aeneas reaching the shores of Latium, to the Romans 
carrying off the Sabine women… Blaskic in his box is 
one single man and has to answer for all our crimes, 
according to the principle of individual criminal 
responsibility which links him to history, he’s a body in 
a chair wearing a headset, he’s on trail in place of all 
those who held a weapon23 
 
This narrative certainly echoes Carl Schmitt’s criticism of the formidable power 
possessed by those able to declare a person to be an “enemy of humanity”. There 
are also two important qualifications to add here to this narrative, which Enard 
addresses. Firstly, despite the fact that the idea of the enemy of humanity is often 
presented as a correlative development to the age of liberal reason – especially its 
internationalization in the post Cold War period (notably evidenced with the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo), its recourse to legal forms of justice is wholly contingent. As 
he narrates of the ‘characters in the Great Trial’, it is all about inserting, 
 
Some order into the law of murder, charged with 
knowing at what instant a bullet in the head was 
legitimate de jure and at what instant it constituted a 
grave breach of the law and customs of war, referring 
endlessly to the rulings of Nuremburg, Jerusalem, 
Rwanda, historical precedents recognized as such by 
the status of the court, retracting customary 
international law in the interpretation of the Geneva 
 
22 Mathias Enard, Zone (London, Fitzcarraldo Editions: 2014) p. 80 
23 Enard, Zone p. 80 
conventions24   
 
Secondly, related to this, as Jacques Derrida purposefully showed, contra Kafka, the 
very nature of law itself is a violent force for intervention, which not only literally 
inscribed the body with markers of guilt before crimes are said to have occurred, but 
it cannot be divorced from the realm of power politics and the way its coding is 
inscribed through the victories of battles. In this regard, the vaunted Laws of War so 
often cited by liberal advocates of the International Criminal Court, can be more 
purposefully inverted to read properly as being the Wars of Law, notably manifest it 
appropriations of guilt, complicity and shame for the furtherance of political agendas 
and moral claims. Such forceful interventions have proven time and again to be 
masks of mastery for regimes of power, which in the process of absorbing the weight 
of history, colonize the political imaginary, inscribe particular narratives of shame, 
and repackage the burdens of historical guilt and human reckoning.  
 
Figuring out the Future 
What form then does the future take, if its styles for living are already burdened by 
the shame of history and its times of catastrophe? Can the future be “figured out” in 
respect to resisting the colonization of the imaginary? Countering the problem of 
representing humanity’s veritable negation and the shame it brings upon us all, 
Rancière’s Deleuzian inspired approach seeks to resurrect what is for many cultural 
theorists an all-too-familiar (if unresolved) debate on the political function of the 
arts. As he writes: 
 
So we have to revise Adorno’s famous phrase, 
according to which art is impossible after Auschwitz. 
The reverse is true: after Auschwitz, to show Auschwitz, 
art is the only thing possible, because art always entails 
the presence of an absence; because it is the very job of 
art to reveal something that is invisible, through the 
controlled power of words and images, connected or 
unconnected; because art alone thereby makes the 
human perceptible, felt. 
 
Rancière’s return to the Adorno question should be taken seriously. Its purpose is to 
rethink the political function of art, and, in doing so, start the process that will allow 
us to reimagine a more artistic conception of the political that is not simply tied to 
perceptions of endangerment and the pure task of human survival. This becomes all 
the more urgent when the burden of guilt is no longer aligned with the violent 
weight of history, but the shame now being expressed by the figures of history who 
are yet to appear on the horizon, even though they are already written as though 
their earthly predicament will be violent, and their fate catastrophically determined.  
 
We are reminded again here by Deleuze’s reading of Bacon, who facing the 
intolerable effectively ‘distinguishes between two violences, that of the spectacle 
and that of sensation, and declares that the first must be renounced to reach the 
 
24 Enard, Zone p.82 
second, it is a kind of declaration of faith in life’25. Indeed, for Deleuze, this homage 
to pay Bacon in terms of affirming against the horror of the spectacle the ‘powerful 
Figure of life’, might also be ‘paid to Beckett or Kafka’ whose ‘indomitable figures’ 
disrupt dogmatic images of thought through their ‘insistence and their presence’26. It 
is here Jacques Derrida’s idea of “survival by deferral” resonates:  
 
Survival in the conventional sense of the term means to 
continue to live, but also to live after death. Speaking of 
translation, Walter Benjamin took pains to distinguish 
between überleben on the one hand, to live after death, as a 
book can survive the death of its author, or a child the death 
of parents, and on the other hand, fortleben, living on, to 
keep on living. All the ideas that have helped me in my work, 
notably those regarding the trace or the spectral, were 
related to the idea of "survival" as a basic dimension. It does 
not derive from either to live or to die. No more than what I 
call "originary mourning." It is something that does not wait 
for so-called "actual" death.  
 
The death of the subject as such appears here for Derrida as an aporia that both 
haunts and yet fascinates: 
 
The trace I leave to me means at once my death, to come or 
already come, and the hope that it will survive me. It is not an 
ambition of immortality; it is fundamental. I leave here a bit 
of paper, I leave, I die; it is impossible to exit this structure; it 
is the unchanging form of my life. Every time I let something 
go, I live my death in writing. An extreme process; we exert 
ourselves without knowing whom exactly the thing we leave 
behind is confided to. Who is going to inherit, and how? It is a 
question that one can pose oneself today more than ever. It 
constantly preoccupies me.  
 
This ultimately brings us back to Deleuze who certainly appreciated this double 
meaning to ones encounter with death. As he wrote in relation to Maurice 
Blanchot’s mediation on he subject, “Any death is double, by the cancellation of the 
great difference that it represents in extension, by the swarming and the liberation 
of small differences that it implies in intensities”27. That is to say, while there is on 
one side a very personal experience with death that simple affirms the finitude of 
our fleeting existence, something lives on in the realm of the infinitely possible and 
yet to be anticipated trajectories (the virtual). Or as Blanchot would explain, ‘My 
speech is a warning that at this very moment death is loose in the world, that it has 
suddenly appeared between me, as I speak, and the being I address: it is there 
between us as the distance that separates us, but this distance is also what prevents 
 
25 Deleuze, Bacon, p.43 
26 Deleuze, Bacon, p.44 
27 Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 333 
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